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Abstract 
 
We empirically analyze disclosure decisions made by 240 MBA programs about which rankings 
to display on their websites. We present three main findings.  First, consistent with theories of 
countersignaling, top schools are least likely to disclose their rankings, whereas mid-ranked 
schools are most likely to disclose. Second, schools that do poorly in the U.S. News rankings are 
more likely to disclose their Princeton Review certification, suggesting that schools treat 
different certifications as substitutes.  Third, conditional on displaying a ranking, the majority of 
schools coarsen information to make it seem more favorable.  The stark patterns in the data help 
to provide empirical evidence on the strategic elements of voluntary disclosure and marketing 
decisions.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the most well-known theories of voluntary disclosure relates to an idea known as 
information unraveling (Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981, Jovanovic 1982).  Considering a setting 
in which there is a single dimension of product quality, these models argue that organizations 
will disclose information about their quality if disclosure costs are low and the information is 
favorable.  In equilibrium, consumers infer that firms that do not disclose their quality are likely 
to be worse than firms that do.  Therefore, through the unraveling process, higher-quality firms 
should have an incentive to reveal information about their product quality, which should then put 
pressure on all firms to disclose.  However, predicted patterns of voluntary disclosure can be 
qualitatively different when we take into account additional features that are prevalent in a 
variety of real-world settings, such as multiple signals of quality and customers’ prior beliefs.  
A leading example of how the traditional unraveling result might break down is presented in 
Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To (2002), who show that disclosure patterns can be non-monotonic, 
with middle-performing firms disclosing their quality while top-performing firms choose to 
withhold information.  This “countersignaling” occurs because a high quality firm withholding 
information signals to potential customers that they are confident that other information about 
them will be favorable. Feltovich et al. (2002) suggest that such countersignaling may underlie a 
wide variety of situations, such as the differences between the ostentatious displays of the 
nouveau riche and the more measured outward approach of old-moneyed families.  Psychologists 
have also investigated ideas related to countersignaling.  Bellezza et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
employees can be perceived to be of higher status when they choose not to conform to a 
workplace norm (for example, by dressing casually when business dress is the standard).   
Moreover, a high quality firm’s benefit to disclosing information may be outweighed by the cost 
of disclosure if consumers already have precise prior beliefs about the very best firms.  To date, 
there is little empirical evidence of situations in which high quality firms are choosing to 
countersignal while lower quality firms are disclosing information.   
In this paper, we graphically and statistically test for unraveling and countersignaling by 
collecting and analyzing the rankings displayed on the websites of 240 top-ranked U.S. business 
schools.  Business schools provide a rich empirical context in which to test for patterns of 
voluntary disclosure of quality reports for several reasons.  First, rankings have been shown to 
have a large effect on applicants’ decisions (Bowman and Bastedo 2009, Meredith 2004, Monks 
and Ehrenberg 1999) and admissions decisions (Conlin et al. 2013). Hence, business schools 
have the incentive to be strategic in their disclosure decisions. Second, rankings are verifiable, a 
condition stipulated in the unraveling literature.  Third, business schools are ranked by many 
media outlets.   Even within a media outlet, such as U.S. News and World Report, multiple 
rankings of MBA programs exist (for example, “Best Evening MBA Program” and “Best MBA 
Program in New England”).   Hence, business schools face a strategic decision about which 
rankings, if any, to reveal rankings on their websites.  Fourth, education decisions are among the   3
most significant choices many people will make in their lifetime and students and policymakers 
are interested in improving the decision making process. 
Turning to the data, we find large amounts of voluntary disclosure of rankings; 65 percent of 
the schools in our sample publish or mention at least one ranking on their main websites.  We 
find that disclosure decisions are non-monotonic as a function of a school’s rank: top schools are 
least likely to display their rankings, mid-ranked schools are most likely to display their 
rankings, and bottom-ranked schools fall in between.  These findings are largely consistent with 
the idea of countersignaling.  We also find that schools that have a branded name, as measured 
by the count of mentions in the New York Times, are less likely to disclose rankings on their 
website, which provides further evidence consistent with consumers’ priors from competing 
signals influence whether a school discloses information. 
Beyond these main results, we consider two other features that are common to many 
disclosure settings but are not captured in the basic unraveling result. First, organizations choose 
not only whether to reveal information, but what information to reveal – and can hence select 
certain dimensions over others. Whereas the existing literature has demonstrated that voluntary 
disclosure of a single dimension of quality information is incomplete (Dranove and Jin 2010, 
Mathios 2000, Jin and Leslie 2003) and that disclosure rates depend on factors such as the 
amount of competition (Jin 2005) and cost of disclosure (Lewis 2010), the idea of selective 
disclosure focuses on situations in which there are multiple pieces of information that a firm can 
choose to disclose.       
Second, there is growing evidence that consumers respond differently to information when it 
is visible or salient than when it is shrouded or opaque (Pope 2009, Brown et al. 2010, Luca and 
Smith 2013).  In these settings, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show theoretically that information 
revelation can break down.   Even when an organization chooses to disclose information, they 
may still choose to shroud certain pieces of information that would make the organization look 
less favorable.   
 These ideas lead us to two additional empirical results regarding voluntary disclosure.  First, 
we show that schools selectively reveal favorable rankings.  For example, schools that do poorly 
or are unranked in U.S. News and World Report are more likely to display an Association to 
Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) accreditation or mention that they made 
Princeton Review’s list of top overall business schools, which is a pooled group with no explicit 
rank.  In fact, exactly zero of the top-50 schools mention that they are included on Princeton 
Review’s unordered list of top programs, while 30% of unranked schools mention that they are 
on the list. This suggests that schools treat different rankings and accreditations as substitutes for 
each other.   
Second, conditional on displaying a ranking, the majority of schools coarsen information to 
make it seem more favorable —for example, saying “top-ranked program” instead of “top-
ranked program in the Northeast,” or “top 20” instead of “ranked number 20.”  Overall, each 
individual ranking is verifiable, but selective disclosure and shrouding of information may 
undermine market mechanisms of voluntary information disclosure.         4
Overall, these findings shed new light on equilibrium patterns of voluntary disclosure in a 
context in which the information being disclosed is relevant to customers and the discloser has 
significant freedom to disclose or not.  In particular, we provide novel field evidence consistent 
with countersignaling, which was first modeled by Feltovich et al (2002).  Moreover, we analyze 
the type of multidimensional disclosure problem that is common in the field, whereas most of 
this literature has focused on single-dimensional disclosure problems.  Our results show that 
there is significant substitutability between information sources. Finally, drawing on the idea of 
shrouded attributes, we are able to relax the assumption that schools will either disclose 
truthfully or not disclose at all, and show that the vast majority of schools engage in some sort of 
shrouding.   
 
2.  Data 
 
This analysis uses two types of data.  First, we compile a set of U.S. business schools that are 
ranked in a number of different sources, as we refer to them, including U.S. News & World 
Report (USNWR), Bloomberg Business Week, Princeton Review, The Economist, Forbes, and 
The Financial Times.  These are popular sources of rankings that can be found on the Internet or 
on newsstands. 
We designate rankings into one of two categories: overall or specialty.  Overall rankings are 
those that rank each business school as a whole; specialty rankings are those that rank specific 
programs (e.g., top part-time or executive MBA programs) or a specific set of schools (e.g., top 
program in New England or at a public university).  Collectively, we refer to these as different 
types of rankings.   
With the exception of Princeton Review, all sources have an explicit ranking for top overall 
business schools.  Princeton Review publishes a list of top overall MBA programs, but it pools 
the programs into a single group rather than explicitly ranking them.  USNWR, Bloomberg 
Business Week, and Princeton Review also have specialty rankings.  Any school listed in any of 
the aforementioned six sources or given any type of rank is included in the final set of 240 
business schools.
4  Across all sources, we have 38 distinct overall and specialty rankings and 
hence 38 distinct variables.
5   
Summary statistics of the ranking can be seen in Table 1.  The variables that include “best” 
take the minimum (best) rank across each source.  The average USNWR overall rank is 55.5.  
The average overall rank across sources is slightly lower (49) because the sources other than 
USNWR do not rank as many programs.  The best overall or specialty rank is 56.8.  On average, 
schools show up in 1.6 overall rankings and 3.2 specialty rankings. 
To obtain our second type of data, we visited each business school’s website in search of any 
mention of rankings,
6 looking specifically at the school’s homepage, the page of its graduate 
                                                            
4 These ranks were available online in the spring of 2012 but typically come out in are released the previous fall. 
5 A complete list of type of rankings is included in Appendix 1.  When a business school is not in a ranking, it is 
coded as missing. 
6 We visited the websites in spring 2012, well after the release of the rankings.   5
program within the business school, and the page of its MBA program.
7  We did not search the 
entire website for each business school, despite the fact that business schools often display 
ranking information on their “About” webpage, “Admissions” webpage, or brochures.  Our 
analysis concentrates only on both common webpages and salient displays of rankings.  
 Schools mention and display rankings in a variety of ways.  Some schools mention their 
overall rank (e.g., “Ranked #9 business school according to The Financial Times”), some 
schools mention specialty rankings (e.g., “Ranked #3 part-time MBA program in USNWR”), and 
some schools just mention the source (e.g., “Top business school according to Business Week”).  
To capture the various ways in which schools mention rankings of the five rankers (USNWR, 
Business Week, The Economist, Forbes, and The Financial Times), we create three indicator 
variables with the following definitions: 
 
1.  Website Mentions Any Rank – equals one if the business school’s website mentions 
any of the five rankers in any capacity, zero otherwise.  
2.  Website Mentions Overall Rank – equals one if the business school’s website 
mentions any of the five rankers’ overall rank, zero otherwise.  
3.  Website Mentions Specialty Rank – equals one if the business school’s website 
mentions any of the five rankers’ specialty ranks, zero otherwise. 
4.  Website Mentions Only Source – equals one if the business school’s website mentions 
any of the five sources, with no specific rankings, zero otherwise. 
 
These variables are not mutually exclusive from one another, and schools that mention numerous 
different ranks are not differentiated from schools that mention one rank.  Table 1’s summary 
statistics of these variables show that, in aggregate, 45 percent of schools mention any rank from 
the five sources.  Many of the rankings mentioned are specialty rankings; only 15 percent of 
schools mention the overall rankings, and 8 percent mention only the source.   
Schools frequently mention lesser-known rankings and the Princeton Review’s specialty 
rankings.  Thus, we create four more variables, identical to the previous four but with mentions 
of these other rankings included.
8  As Table 1 shows, these four variables are greater than (or 
equal to) the previous four, and 65 percent of schools mention any of these ranks.
9 
The next few variables in Table 1 show the prevalence of being mentioned on a website for 
each source.  USNWR, Business Week, and Princeton Review are mentioned on schools’ 
websites, in any capacity, 32, 21, and 23 percent of the time, respectively.  Note that the 
Princeton Review mentions are quite frequently the pooled overall top 300-business schools 
rank, which we separately analyze.  This overall rank is mentioned 18 percent of the time.   
                                                            
7 Sometimes these web pages are one and in the same or do not exist.  If there is a choice on the MBA program 
webpage, we select the full-time program. 
8 Common other rankings include Princeton Review’s specialty rankings, Poets & Quants, and Aspen Institute. 
9 This statistic includes those schools that simply say that the school is ranked and provide no additional 
information.  Excluding these few non-specific mentions of rankings will not change future results.      6
The next few outcome variables in Table 1 are various ways in which schools either present 
rankings that pool them with other top schools or shroud information.  The first variable, Website 
Mentions Highly Ranked With No Additional Information, equals one when a school simply says 
it is highly ranked and zero otherwise.  The 12 percent of schools that do this do not mention the 
source, the type of ranking, or even the rank.  
The next variable is Website Mentions AACSB.  The Association to Advance Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB) is an accreditation organization that only accredits approximately 
5 percent of business schools worldwide, including almost all schools in this sample.  Most of 
the 57 percent of schools that mention AACSB simply post the AACSB logo on their website.   
The last outcome variable is Website Shrouds Information, which documents when there is a 
lack of potentially informative details coupled with some mention of rankings.  Admittedly, 
schools cannot include every piece of ranking information on their website.  Yet some schools 
seem to be deliberately shroud information—for example, saying only that they are “top ranked,” 
or, less dramatically, that they are “ranked top 20” when they fall in the 20
th position.  Similarly, 
posting rankings from past years with no mention of the current year’s rankings qualifies as 
shrouding information.  Appendix 2 presents a complete list of the ways we document shrouding.  
Conditional on mentioning ranks, 72 percent of schools shroud details.   
The last two variables in Table 1 are obtained online from the New York Times website.  The 
first variable is the count of the number of times the university is mentioned in the New York 
Times.  The second is the count for the business school associated with the university.  These 
measures, with relatively high means, represent a measure of potential exposure to information 
about a school. 
 
2.1. Who Gets Ranked? 
 
Using the five overall rankings sources, we find that each source ranks a different number of 
programs. Even where there is overlap in the number of programs ranked, there is no agreement 
on which programs are the best.  To demonstrate the lack of agreement, Table 2 displays the 
counts of unique programs in several buckets of ranks. Generalizing beyond business-school 
rankings, in markets where more disagreement exists among ranking sources, there will be more 
scope for firms to selectively disclose information.   
As shown in Table 2, across our five sources, there are 15 different top 10 programs and 21 
programs ranked 11-20.  Each of the next few buckets, through 61-70, has no less than 26 unique 
schools in its ten possible slots.  Thus, the lower the rank, the more disagreement across sources 
there seems to be.  Buckets greater than 70 have fewer unique schools, but this is due in part to 
the fact that because some of our sources do not rank this many programs. 
 
 
 
   7
3.  Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we investigate patterns of voluntary disclosure, testing for unraveling and 
countersignaling, selective disclosure, and shrouding.  For each of these phenomena, we provide 
a graphical analysis and then present the supporting regressions.   
 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
 
Throughout this section, we will rely on the same general specification and only vary the 
outcome variables.  The main specification is as follows:  
 
 
 
where   is the outcome of interest for school s.   is an indicator equal to one if 
the overall rank of business school s falls within the range noted in the parentheses and equals 
zero otherwise.  The overall rank comes from USNWR, which goes up to 116.
10  Schools that are 
“unranked” show up in some source and type of rankings, but not in the USNWR overall rank.  
The omitted variable is the set of schools ranked 1-10 and the set of  ’s are the coefficient that 
describe how likely the range of schools are to fall into the outcome variable, relative to schools 
ranked 1-10.  Finally,   is a random error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
outcome variable. 
We estimate all specifications using OLS and robust standard errors.
11  
  
3.2. Unraveling and Countersignaling 
 
Figure 1 graphically tests for unraveling and countersignaling.  Consistent with the idea of 
countersignalling, we find that disclosure is non-monotonic in the school’s ranking; that is, top-
ranked schools are least likely to disclose their rankings.  If one truncates the distribution and 
only looks at schools ranked 26 and lower, the traditional unraveling result emerges; over 80 
percent of these schools mention ranks.  These middle-ranked schools are most likely to disclose 
their ranking; the rate of disclosure declines for lower-ranked schools.   
Table 3 tests the statistical robustness of these results.  Column 1 (Any Rank) are results from 
when the dependent variable equals one if the website mentions any rank from the five sources 
and zero otherwise- one of our broad measures of disclosure.  The coefficient on the indicator 
variable ranked 11-25 equals 0.109 but is not statistically different than zero.  On the other hand, 
the coefficient on schools ranked 26-50 equals 0.659 and is statistically significant.  This means 
that relative to schools ranked 1-10, schools ranked 26-50 are 65.9 percentage points more likely 
                                                            
10 Alternatively, we use best overall rank across the five sources.  Results are not sensitive to the alternate definition 
but are presented in the appendices. 
11 All results are robust to using a probit model. 
      s s s s s s s unranked I I I I I OUTCOME                   5 4 3 2 1 0 116 76 75 51 50 26 25 11
s OUTCOME s I ) (

s   8
to mention or display any rank.  Similarly, schools ranked 51-75 are more than 56 percentage 
points more likely than a top 10 school to mention a ranking.  However, both schools ranked 
from 76-116 and unranked schools are just over 30 percentage points more likely to mention a 
rank than are top 10 schools, which is statistically less than the likelihood of schools ranked 26-
50 mentioning a rank.
12  Overall, a clear non-linearity emerges in this sample, such that the best 
and worst schools are less likely than middle-ranked schools to mention rankings on their 
websites. 
Columns 2 and 3 repeat this specification, but break the dependent variable of ranking 
mentions into rankings of overall rankings (e.g., best school overall) and specialty rankings (e.g., 
within a region or according to a specialty).  Column 2 presents results when the outcome 
variable is Overall Rank, which does not include mention of a specialty ranking.  The only 
coefficient that is large in magnitude and statistically different than zero is the indicator for 
schools ranked 26-50.  The coefficient implies that those schools are 28.4 percentage points more 
likely to mention rankings than top 10 schools.  Column 3 uses Specialty Rank as a dependent 
variable.  All coefficients are positive and statistically different than zero.  Here, we see the non-
linearity that was driving the results in the first column, where schools ranked between 26 and 75 
are much more likely to mention rankings than top 10 schools and also more likely than the other 
schools, albeit less so.   
Columns 4-6 present the same specifications but expand the set of ranking institutions 
(columns 1-3 only include the five most popular institutions), and Column 4 corresponds to 
Figure 1.  We still see a non-monotonic pattern where the mid-ranked schools are statistically 
more likely than the best and worst schools to mention rankings. 
  
3.2.1.  Why Do Schools Countersignal? 
 
One should expect business schools to disclose their rankings when the benefit of doing so is 
greater than the cost.  In this context, the cost of disclosure (on the school’s website) is very low.  
Virtually all business schools regularly update their websites with news about their school, 
students, and faculty, so the cost of posting a ranking online is trivial.  One might think that 
space is the limiting factor, but there is a significant amount of open space on many of these 
websites.  Moreover, displaying a ranking takes very little space.  Hence, it seems unlikely that 
high costs are prohibitive in this situation – especially in light of the high overall rates of 
disclosure.   
Given this, why don’t top schools disclose their rankings? Consistent with the 
countersignaling model of Feltovich et al. 2002, mid-ranked schools may be able to separate 
themselves from low-ranked schools by posting their rankings.  However, applicants likely 
already know that schools such as Stanford are high quality.  Top schools can then 
                                                            
12 We tested this using an F-Test.  Unranked schools are also statistically less likely to mention ranks than schools 
ranked 51-75.   9
“countersignal,” or show that they don’t need to disclose their rankings because they know that 
other information about them is so favorable.   
More generally, the prior beliefs of applicants influence the benefits of disclosure. For 
example, looking at public and “market-oriented” report cards of Medicare HMOs, Dafny and 
Dranove (2008) show that consumers respond more in situations where there is a large variance 
in HMO quality (in other words, when prior beliefs are imprecise). In situations where reports 
present information that customers already have and hence only serve to confirm prior beliefs, 
reports do not have an impact on decisions.   In our setting, prior beliefs also play an important 
role.  While it could be the case that students generally know more about top schools (and hence 
have more precise priors in this part of the ranking distribution), existing work has demonstrated 
that rankings influence application behavior at all parts of the distribution (Monks and Ehrenberg 
1999, Smith and Luca 2013, Reback and Alter 2014).  Moreover, the impact on student decisions 
is especially large for the top schools, as demonstrated by Bowman and Bastedo (2009), who 
show that getting on the front page of USNWR rankings has a large impact on applications. 
Despite the fact that rankings have some informational value at all parts of the distribution, top 
schools still find countersignaling to be an optimal strategy.   
 
3.2.2.  Branded Schools  
 
More generally, if a school’s quality is well known to applicants, then it will face different 
incentives to disclose its rankings.  To test this idea, we examine whether business schools that 
are mentioned in the New York Times more frequently are less likely to disclose.  Column 1 
shows that when the university as a whole is frequently written about in the New York Times, 
there is a negative but insignificant effect on the probability of disclosing a rank on the school’s 
website.  However, a one percent increase in the business school being written about in the New 
York Times corresponds to a 4.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of disclosing a rank 
on the website.  The next few columns test the sensitivity of these results and the qualitative 
result holds- business schools that are more frequently written about are less likely to disclose.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis that a school’s disclosure decision is influenced by other 
information that students are receiving. 
 
3.3. Selective Disclosure 
 
Many business school ratings produce an ordinal ranking of a set of schools.  However, there 
are two information sources – the Princeton Review overall ranking and AACSB certification – 
that simply provide a list of accredited or “top” schools.  These lists provide a certification to 
hundreds of schools, but do not differentiate between the quality of the different schools.  Hence, 
a school that is ranked number 100 and a school that is ranked 1 would receive the same rating in 
these systems.   These ratings should then be most attractive to schools with lower rankings, 
which can attempt to pool themselves with top schools and to separate themselves from schools   10
that fall outside of the lists.  In contrast, top schools may again prefer to countersignal by 
withholding this information, given the fact that students likely know that top schools would be 
on this list and the fact that top schools have little incentive to try to pool with middle-ranked 
schools.   
 To test this, we analyze the decision to disclose Princeton Review and AACSB ratings as a 
function of how a school does on the U.S. News & World Report Ranking.  Figure 2 displays the 
result. Again consistent with the countersignaling hypothesis, no top 10 schools mention this 
information.  There is a steady increase in both outcomes as the rank gets worse, and unranked 
schools are much more likely thank ranked schools to mention this information.  In fact, 78 
percent of unranked schools mention that they are AACSB certified.   
Table 6 presents these results in the form of a regression.  The first column’s outcome 
variable is School’s Website Mentions Princeton Review Overall Rank.  The first few coefficient 
estimates indicate that there are no differences in the likelihood of mentioning this rank among 
the top 50 schools.  The next two coefficients increase in magnitude, and the coefficient on 
unranked schools jumps to 0.305 and is statistically different than zero.  This means that 
unranked schools are over 30 percentage points more likely to mention (or display) that they are 
ranked among the best by Princeton Review than are top-ranked schools.   
The second outcome variable is School’s Website Mentions AACSB Certification.  Moving 
down the table, the coefficient estimates steadily increase.  In other words, schools ranked 
relatively low are more likely to advertise the accreditation than the best-ranked schools.  In fact, 
the lowest-ranked schools and unranked schools are 64 and 78 percentage points, respectively, 
more likely to mention AACSB than the top 10 schools.   
Overall, top ranked schools withhold this information while middle-ranked, low-ranked, and 
unranked schools tend to advertise these coarse signals.
13.   
 
3.4.Shrouding 
 
Returning to Figure 1, we see that most schools shroud information.  The unconditional 
likelihood of shrouding is highest for the middle-ranked schools, but only because middle-ranked 
schools are most likely to disclose information.  Conditional on displaying a ranking, levels of 
shrouding are not materially different across different parts of the ranking distribution. Table 5 
presents the corresponding regressions on various forms of shrouding.  The first column of Table 
5 is School’s Website Mentions Top Ranked with No Supporting Information. Despite the fact 
that information is verifiable in this setting, this analysis shows that shrouding is still extremely 
prevalent. 
Why do schools shroud?  Based on the existing literature, we know that small changes, such 
as making information more or less salient to students, affect their decisions (Bowman and 
Bastedo 2009, Luca and Smith 2013, Pallais forthcoming). Hence, this is a setting where 
shrouding may be an effective strategy.  Moreover, Bowman and Bastedo (2009) show that 
                                                            
13 Appendix 4 presents consistent results when using “Best Overall Rank” in place of USNWR overall rank.   11
schools benefit from being on the first page of the U.S. News & World Report rankings.  This 
suggests that student response to rankings is coarse – which could help to explain why schools 
coarsen information.  
 
 
4.  Discussion 
 
The results of this paper suggest that, taken in aggregate, voluntary information disclosure is 
more nuanced than full or no disclosure. In the context we study, voluntary disclosure seems to 
be a function of the existing brand: schools at the very top countersignal by withholding quality 
reports, but partial unraveling occurs lower in the ranks.  Moreover, most schools that mention 
rankings also shroud details.  Even when reports are of high quality and completely verifiable, 
firms can choose how to present a result. 
While we have focused on a business school’s decisions about what information to disclose, 
we expect the insights of this paper to generalized to a wide variety of settings.  For example, 
there has been a proliferation of information sources about product quality in recent decades; 
rankings, certifications, and quality reports abound.  While consumers may go directly to each of 
these sources, all firms also face a strategic decision about which pieces of information – if any – 
to voluntarily present to consumers.   Restaurants frequently display their Yelp rating, Zagat 
score, newspaper reviews, and other endorsements. Car companies announce their results from 
Car & Driver, JD Power, and Consumer Reports. Our findings help to provide insight into the 
strategic elements of disclosure decisions that organizations regularly face.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
USNWR Overall Rank 112        55.46  32.08     1 107
Best Overall Rank 116        49.03  31.44     1 107
Best Overall or Specialty Rank 240        56.82  60.44     1 166
Count of Overall Rankings 240        1.58     2.20       0 6
Count of Specialty Rankings 240        3.19     3.81       0 19
Website Mentions Any Rank 240        0.45     0.50       0 1
Website Mentions Overall Rank 240        0.15     0.36       0 1
Website Mentions Specialty Rank 240        0.33     0.47       0 1
Website Mentions Ranker Generally 240        0.08     0.27       0 1
Website Mentions Any Rank (including other rankers) 240        0.65     0.48       0 1
Website Mentions Overall Rank (including other rankers) 240        0.18     0.38       0 1
Website Mentions Specialty Rank (including other rankers) 240        0.44     0.50       0 1
Website Mentions Ranker Generally (including other rankers) 240        0.08     0.28       0 1
Website Mentions Any USNWR Rank 240        0.32     0.47       0 1
Website Mentions Any Business Week Rank 240        0.21     0.41       0 1
Website Mentions Any Financial Times Rank 240        0.08     0.28       0 1
Website Mentions Any Forbes Rank 240        0.03     0.18       0 1
Website Mentions Any Economist Rank 240        0.03     0.18       0 1
Website Mentions Any Other Rank 240        0.20     0.40       0 1
Website Mentions Any Princeton Review Rank 240        0.23     0.42       0 1
Website Mentions Princeton Review Overall Rank 240        0.18     0.39       0 1
Website Mentions Highly Ranked With No Additional Information 240        0.12     0.32       0 1
Website Mentions AACSB 240        0.57     0.50       0 1
Website Shrouds Information* 156        0.72     0.45       0 1
*Conditional on mentioning rankings.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes:  Overall ranks include USNWR, Business Week, Forbes, The Financial Times, and The Economist.  
Specialty ranks also include Princeton Review.  Only includes U.S. programs.
Observation level = Business School  15
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Variable Any Rank Overall Rank Specialty Rank Any Rank Overall Rank Specialty Rank
Ranked 11 - 25 0.109 -0.024 0.200* 0.309** -0.024 0.200*
(0.137) (0.109) (0.105) (0.155) (0.109) (0.105)
Ranked 26 - 50 0.659*** 0.284** 0.583*** 0.784*** 0.284** 0.625***
(0.125) (0.133) (0.102) (0.111) (0.133) (0.100)
Ranked 51 - 75 0.564*** 0.047 0.552*** 0.668*** 0.047 0.655***
(0.125) (0.109) (0.094) (0.119) (0.109) (0.089)
Ranked 76 - 116 0.364*** 0.030 0.273*** 0.576*** 0.091 0.455***
(0.124) (0.105) (0.079) (0.121) (0.111) (0.088)
Unranked 0.323*** 0.050 0.281*** 0.565*** 0.081 0.422***
(0.098) (0.093) (0.040) (0.098) (0.094) (0.044)
Constant 0.091 0.091 -0.000 0.091 0.091 -0.000
(0.088) (0.088) - (0.088) (0.088) -
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
R-squared 0.099 0.045 0.092 0.109 0.035 0.088
Table 3: Test of Unraveling
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if Ranking is Displayed, 0 Otherwise
Displays Ranking by Five Major Rankers Displays Ranking by Any Ranker
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses.  *** means significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  
Five major rankers include USNWR, Business Week, Forbes, The Financial Times, and The Economist.  
Ranks from USNWR.  Only includes U.S. programs.
Omitted Variable = Top 10 Business School  17
 
 
 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ranked 11 - 25 0.105 0.043 0.047 0.150 0.032
(0.133) (0.139) (0.138) (0.142) (0.138)
Ranked 26 - 50 0.649*** 0.588*** 0.590*** 0.738*** 0.594***
(0.124) (0.130) (0.129) (0.139) (0.141)
Ranked 51 - 75 0.547*** 0.457*** 0.459*** 0.789*** 0.609***
(0.125) (0.138) (0.137) (0.157) (0.166)
Ranked 76 - 116 0.334*** 0.270** 0.265** 0.546*** 0.329*
(0.125) (0.132) (0.132) (0.171) (0.177)
Unranked 0.309*** 0.204* 0.209* 0.453** 0.292
(0.097) (0.114) (0.112) (0.187) (0.182)
-0.025 -- -0.011 -- -0.064**
(0.022) -- (0.023) -- (0.026)
-- -0.041** -0.038* -- -0.065**
-- (0.020) (0.022) -- (0.026)
USNWR Undergraduate Ranking -- -- -- -0.002 -0.002
-- -- -- (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.058 0.203* 0.179 0.109 0.199*
(0.086) (0.105) (0.112) (0.090) (0.116)
Observations 240 240 240 146 146
R-squared 0.104 0.115 0.116 0.218 0.285
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses.  *** means significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Dependent 
variable only includes mentions from five major rankers, which include USNWR, Business Week, Forbes, The Financial 
Times, and The Economist.  Ranks from USNWR.  Only includes U.S. programs.
log (# times university in NY Times article 
search/10,000)
log (# times business school in NY Times 
article search/10,000)
Table 4: Test of Branded Schools' Disclosure
Linear Probability Model
Omitted Variable = Top 10 Business School
Dependent Variable = 1 if Ranking is Displayed, 0 Otherwise  18
 
Variable
Mentions Top Ranked 
With No Supporting 
Information
Any Shrouding of 
Information
Ranked 11 - 25 0.200* 0.176
(0.105) (0.145)
Ranked 26 - 50 0.333*** 0.576***
(0.097) (0.131)
Ranked 51 - 75 0.103* 0.495***
(0.057) (0.128)
Ranked 76 - 116 0.152** 0.424***
(0.063) (0.124)
Unranked 0.070*** 0.362***
(0.023) (0.098)
Constant -0.000 0.091
- (0.088)
Observations 240 240
R-squared 0.069 0.061
Table 5: Test of Information Shrouding
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if Shrouding, 0 Otherwise
Type of Shrouding:
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses.  *** means 
significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Five 
major rankers include USNWR, Business Week, Forbes, 
The Financial Times, and The Economist.  Ranks from 
USNWR.  Only includes U.S. programs.
Omitted Variable = Top 10 Business School  19
 
  
Variable
School's Website 
Mentions Princeton 
Review Overall Rank
School's Website Mentions 
AACSB Certification
Ranked 11 - 25 0.000 0.067
(0.000) (0.065)
Ranked 26 - 50 0.000 0.208**
(0.000) (0.084)
Ranked 51 - 75 0.069 0.345***
(0.048) (0.089)
Ranked 76 - 116 0.091* 0.636***
(0.051) (0.085)
Unranked 0.305*** 0.781***
(0.041) (0.037)
Constant -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 240 240
R-squared 0.118 0.303
Table 6: Test of Selective Disclosure
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if Selectively Disclose, 0 Otherwise
Type of Selective Disclosure:
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses.  *** means significant at 
1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Princeton Review does not 
explicitly rank school but rather pools into approximately top 300 
schools.  AACSB accredits approximatel 5% of worldwide business 
schools.  Ranks from USNWR.  Only includes U.S. programs.
Omitted Variable = Top 10 Business School  20
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Figure 2: Are Competing Information Sources 
Substitutes?
Mentions Princeton
Review Overall Rank
Mentions AACSB
Certification  21
Appendix 
 
 
 
Source Type
Number of 
Programs Ranked*
1 USNWR Overall Business School 112
2 USNWR Accounting 32
3 USNWR Entrepreneurship 27
4 USNWR Executive MBA 24
5 USNWR Finance 28
6 USNWR Information Systems 21
7 USNWR International 21
8 USNWR Management 21
9U S N W R M a r k e t i n g 2 4
10 USNWR Non-profit 10
11 USNWR Part-time 192
12 USNWR Productions/Operations 24
13 USNWR Supply Chain/Logistics 24
14 Business Week Overall Business School 57
15 Business Week Executive MBA 31
16 Business Week Part-time 74
17 Business Week Part-time Mid-Atlantic Region 10
18 Business Week Part-time Midwest Region 18
19 Business Week Part-time Northeast Region 9
20 Business Week Part-time South Region 14
21 Business Week Part-time Southwest Region 8
22 Business Week Part-time West Region 15
23 Business Week Executive Education - Open Enrollment 12
24 Business Week Executive Education - Custom Program 10
25 Forbes Overall Business School 73
26 The Economist Overall Business School 47
27 Financial Times Overall Business School 53
28 Princeton Review Entrepreneurship 24
29 Princeton Review Administered 10
30 Princeton Review Campus Environment 10
31 Princeton Review Campus Facilities 10
32 Princeton Review Career 9
33 Princeton Review Classroom 9
34 Princeton Review Professors 10
35 Princeton Review Minorities 9
36 Princeton Review Women 10
37 Princeton Review Family Friendly 10
38 Princeton Review Toughest Entry 10
Appendix 1: Sources and Type of Rankings
*Only includes U.S. business schools.  22
 
  
1 Says top ranked but provides no additional information.
2 Says top ranked but provides partial information.
3 Says top ranked but puts links to information on another webpage.
4 Presents ranking from past years.
5 Pools into tiers (e.g. ranked #20 but says among the top 20).
6 Converts into percent (e.g. ranked #20 but says ranked in top 5%).
7 Prominently says top ranked and fine print provides details.
8 Displays the logo of ranker with no additional information.
9 Says top ranked business school but does not say it is a specialty 
ranking (e.g. executive MBA).
Appendix 2: Types of Shrouding on Website  23
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Any Rank Overall Rank Specialty Rank
Ranked 11 - 25 0.256* 0.156 0.322**
(0.146) (0.119) (0.133)
Ranked 26 - 50 0.581*** 0.219** 0.469***
(0.124) (0.108) (0.116)
Ranked 51 - 75 0.480*** 0.095 0.385***
(0.126) (0.093) (0.112)
Ranked 76 - 116 0.283** 0.058 0.142
(0.135) (0.094) (0.106)
Unranked 0.278*** 0.062 0.224***
(0.100) (0.072) (0.077)
Constant 0.133 0.067 0.067
(0.089) (0.065) (0.065)
Observations 240 240 240
R-squared 0.077 0.025 0.062
Appendix 3: Which Business Schools Mention Ranking on Website
Linear Probability Model
Omitted Variable = Top 10 Business School
School's Website Mentions (five major rankers):
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses.  *** means significant at 1% level, ** at 
5%, and * at 10%.  Five major rankers include USNWR, Business Week, Forbes, 
The Financial Times, and The Economist.  Other rankers include Princeton Review's 
specialty ranks (not overall pooled rank) and other news sources.  Only includes U.S. 
programs.
Using Best Overall Rank  24
 
 
 
 
Variable
School's Website 
Mentions Princeton 
Review Overall Rank
School's Website 
Mentions AACSB 
Certification
Mentions Top Ranked 
With No Supporting 
Information
Any Shrouding of 
Information
Ranked 11 - 25 -0.000 0.111 0.222** 0.322**
(.) (0.075) (0.099) (0.133)
Ranked 26 - 50 -0.000 0.250*** 0.321*** 0.719***
(.) (0.083) (0.089) (0.102)
Ranked 51 - 75 0.129** 0.419*** 0.097* 0.449***
(0.061) (0.090) (0.054) (0.112)
Ranked 76 - 116 0.042 0.708*** 0.125* 0.392***
(0.041) (0.094) (0.068) (0.122)
Unranked 0.315*** 0.790*** 0.073*** 0.385***
(0.042) (0.037) (0.024) (0.079)
Constant 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.067
- - - (0.065)
Observations 240 240 240 240
R-squared 0.132 0.318 0.074 0.091
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses.  *** means significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  
Princeton Review does not explicitly rank school but rather pools into approximately top 300 schools.  AACSB 
accredits approximatel 5% of worldwide business schools.  Only includes U.S. programs.
Appendix 4: Which Business Schools Mention Ranking on Website
Using Best Overall Rank
Linear Probability Model
Omitted Variable = Top 10 Business School
Information Disclosure Shrouding